A review of cloud, network, and application design that surfaces systemic risk and creates usable boundary and system diagrams for commercial platforms and scoped agency or prime-contractor environments.
Fintechs and businesses scaling cloud systems, plus agencies and prime contractors needing boundary diagrams and security design review.
2–3 weeks
$4,500
Published price is a commercial starting estimate, not a Schedule rate. Government work requires a separately negotiated SOW or task-order scope and price.
Government or federal contracting work is scoped and priced separately through a negotiated statement of work or task order; published prices are not Schedule rates.
This assessment is for teams changing cloud architecture, acquiring a system, or preparing a major enterprise launch where a security assumption could become an expensive dependency. It is especially useful when diagrams are outdated or several teams own parts of the trust boundary.
A customer security review, a material vulnerability, an acquisition, or a regulator question can all justify a fresh architectural view. The engagement gives technical leaders a neutral way to test design choices before they become production constraints.
The review follows data and control paths through the selected environment: identities, ingress, workloads, storage, queues, administration, observability, vendors, and recovery. We compare intended architecture with the configuration and operational evidence that is available.
Attention goes to systemic issues such as broad trust zones, implicit network access, weak administrative paths, unmanaged secrets, missing tenant isolation, insufficient recovery boundaries, and security controls that exist only in documentation. Findings are framed around the business workflow they could interrupt.
Recommendations distinguish a design correction from a configuration fix and from a process owner. Each item includes a practical verification step, so engineers can tell when a hardening action is complete and leaders can see which risks remain accepted.
The assessment is not a penetration test and does not silently change production. It is a decision-quality review that can guide implementation, a later vulnerability assessment, or a more focused threat model.
For agency or prime environments, scoped diagrams can record the system boundary, interagency and external connections, hosting responsibilities, and data paths. The SOW confirms diagram acceptance, role-based evidence access, and explicit exclusions.
A two-to-three-week review combines architecture intake, boundary and dependency diagrams, configuration sampling, owner interviews, risk calibration, and readout. Government scope agrees the system boundary, access roles, evidence sources, and diagram acceptance in the SOW.
The outputs are designed to be discussed by architects and executives without losing the technical detail needed to act.
Architecture decisions are strongest when they connect to the controls around them. Continue with:
No. It is a human-led architecture review supported by configuration and evidence sampling. A vulnerability scan may be a useful follow-on, but this engagement focuses on trust boundaries, design assumptions, ownership, and systemic exposure.
Yes. A migration is a useful trigger because identity, network segmentation, logging, recovery, and vendor dependencies can be checked before the new environment becomes difficult to change.
Not always. The scope can use read-only views, diagrams, design records, and owner interviews. A government SOW identifies system boundaries, approved roles, evidence access, exclusions, and diagram acceptance before any access.
The report separates architectural decisions from implementation tasks and gives each meaningful issue a priority and verification path. Teams often continue with a threat model, remediation roadmap, or recurring architecture advisory.